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4. [ ] IRS/DDI, called regarding a request he had received from State Department. State is interested in showing an Agency handbook on [ ] to a member (unnamed) of the staff of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa at a meeting this afternoon. I suggested that [ ] tell State that it is our practice not to display intelligence documents to congressional staff members and we would prefer that it not be done in this instance. I noted that this merely would whet the appetite of the staffer for a copy of the document and possibly result in his mentioning it to some of his congressional staff colleagues.

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5. [ ] Picked up from Jack Norpel, Senate Internal Security Subcommittee staff, an item of interest to [ ]

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6. [ ] James Calloway, Senate Appropriations Committee staff, called me late in the day to say Chairman McClellan suggested 10:30 a.m. Friday, 26 January as a time for the Director to meet with him and indicated the Senator would prefer to make this a private meeting between the Director and himself.

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7. [ ] George Murphy, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy staff, called regarding an article in the Washington Post of 19 January reporting a talk in Peking between Chou En-lai and Takeo Kimura, of Japan, where Chou En-lai suggested that Japan needs "the American nuclear umbrella" for the time being to protect it against the Soviet Union. Murphy wanted the complete text of this speech if it was available. After checking with [ ] I advised Murphy's office that the story of this meeting was [ ] but there had been no text released which was not unusual in this type informal speech.

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8. [ ] Delivered to Pete Murphy, House Appropriations Committee staff, a blind memorandum commenting on the Soviet aerospace newsletter concerning MIG-25.

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\* Soviet land forces have been bolstered by the production of two new tanks and improved conventional artillery shells, bombs and missile and rocket warheads.

Laird took the opportunity to warn the Congress that it is "premature" to discuss "the profound and lasting shift" in the Soviet Union's basic attitudes and approach toward the West. "Detente without adequate defense is delusion," he said.

Laird emphasized that while the era of negotiations is well upon us with the SALT and Berlin agreements and with the European Security Conference preparatory talks and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) initial talks soon to begin, the U. S. can not ignore:

- \* the large, highly capable and improving Warsaw Pact forces in Europe.
- \* The rapid and sustained Soviet arms expansion and qualitative improvement in recent years.
- \* The worldwide expansion of Soviet maritime forces and activity.
- \* the growing Soviet military presence and involvement in areas adjacent to NATO such as the Middle East and the Indian Ocean.

"The simple fact is that the Soviet military build-up, conventional as well as nuclear, continues with vigorous momentum."

#### FOXBAT SUCCESSOR DEVELOPED

The Soviet Union has apparently developed a supersonic successor to the MIG-23 FOXBAT fighter aircraft, a plane which may pose a new challenge to the U. S. fighter aircraft technology.

The new aircraft, not yet in production, designated the MIG-25, is in the same speed range as the FOXBAT but has a longer range and greater maneuverability and diversity of fighter operations. In addition, it carries more sophisticated weapons systems.

There are three versions of the MIG-23 FOXBAT, with speeds ranging from about Mach 2.8 to Mach 3.75. One of the most advanced versions, identified by the Soviets as the E-266, has a ceiling in excess of 80,000 feet, carries four air-to-air missiles and is equipped with a down-looking radar.

Known?

The FOXBAT successor to this new MIG fighter has already introduced the highest priority into the development of the Navy-Grumman F-14 TOMCAT and the Air Force-McDonnell F-15 EAGLE in order to counter the threat of that most advanced strike and interceptor fighter.

Last March Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, emphasized that the FOXBAT and the SU-11 FLAGON A, also with an 80,000-foot ceiling and a Mach 2.5 speed, operational delta-wing interceptor, had demonstrated a superiority to the U. S. Navy / Air Force-McDonnell Douglas F-4 PHANTOM 2.

Zumwalt said the F-14 is the "only aircraft within near-term fleet introduction that possesses the necessary capability to counter the FOXBAT within acceptable launch parameters." He added that the F-14 with its Hughes PHOENIX missiles will be able to penetrate the FOXBAT's "haven" above 70,000 feet and "has the high probability of destroying FOXBAT before the latter can launch its weapons."

The FOXBAT's major limitation is its short range and high fuel consumption. This was one of the reasons why Zumwalt said the F-14 and the F-15 are expected to be "superior to any tactical aircraft the Soviets are likely to deploy in the 1970's."

Now comes the MIG-25 with its greater range, maneuverability, operational diversity, and more advanced weapons systems.

### LUNA 21 SHOULD LAND ON MOON JAN. 16

LUNA 21 is demonstrating the characteristics of a lunar landing mission which may reach the lunar surface early tomorrow morning January 16, when the Moon is in view of the Soviet ground command center. The spacecraft was expected to go into lunar orbit in preparation for the landing on Friday, Jan. 12, or early Saturday, Jan. 13.

The mission may be either a soil sampling operation and return to Earth or a second LUNOKHOD surface exploration. There have been two successful soil sampling missions and only one LUNOKHOD. The mission appears to be programmed for a landing on the sunlit portion of the Moon's surface.

As a lander, LUNA 21 would be the eighth lunar lander of the Soviet's second series which began in 1969 with the incomplete mission of LUNA 15 and which, apparently, was in a competitive time frame with the APOLLO 11 manned lunar landing mission.

In addition to LUNA 15, which failed to successfully complete its landing maneuver on July 21, 1969, there have been two Earth orbit failures of this lander series, followed by LUNA 16 and LUNA 17 (both in 1970), LUNA 18 (another apparent landing failure in 1971) and LUNA 20 last year. LUNA 16 returned a soil sample to the Soviet Union, as did LUNA 20. LUNA 17 deposited LUNOKHOD 1 on the lunar surface on Nov. 17, 1970.

Three hours after launch from Baikonur at 11:55 AM, Jan. 8 (1:55 AM EST), LUNA 21 was tracked in an Earth orbit of 209/246 kilometers (130/153 miles), 51.5 degrees, 90.1 minutes. Almost nine hours after launch, the platform which thrust LUNA 21 into its lunar trajectory was tracked at 192/238 kilometers (119/148 miles), 51.5 degrees, 88.8 minutes.

If LUNA 21 is a soil sample-Earth return mission, it should be back on Earth sometime around Saturday, Jan. 20. It is the 31st Soviet lunar mission in the past 14 years -- since Jan. 2, 1959.

### SOVIET LUNAR MISSIONS

#### 1959-1973

- |    |        |           |                |                             |
|----|--------|-----------|----------------|-----------------------------|
| 1) | Luna 1 | 1/2/1959  | Impact mission | Missed 1/4/59 by 3000 miles |
| 2) | Luna 2 | 9/12/1959 | Impact mission | Impact: 9/13/59             |
| 3) | Luna 3 | 10/4/1959 | Orbit mission  | 74380 miles photography     |

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